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D van Zyl*
[2] However tempted I may be to deal with specific cases and much publicised 
judgments, I shall refrain from doing so inasmuch as the matters to which they 
relate remain pending and may indeed not be finalised for some time. 
Furthermore they have played a pivotal role in the political uncertainty which 
has been taxing the country in recent times. I speak, of course, of the criminal 
proceedings between the National Director of Public Prosecutions and the 
President of the African National Congress, Mr JG Zuma, and the various 
proceedings between Judge President JM Hlophe and the Constitutional Court. 
Both cases are a cause of grave concern to lawyers and ordinary peace-loving 
South Africans who would dearly like to see an end to the bitter accusations 




[1] In recent times the judiciary has been under almost constant fire as a result 
of certain controversial events involving the courts and individual judges. This 
has given rise to uncalled for, and frequently unwarranted, publicity of an 
extremely adverse and negative nature. Despite the fact that only a relatively 
small number of judges has been involved, the bench as a whole has been 
affected and even severely tainted by this activity. Public confidence in the 
courts has been eroded and the independence of the judiciary has come under 
serious threat.  
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[3] Like many of my colleagues in this country and elsewhere, I am deeply 
concerned that the bench, more particularly the Constitutional Court, has been 
subjected to virulent, if not positively defamatory attacks by politicians and other 
persons who should know better. It is quite abhorrent to describe a judge as 
"counter-revolutionary" if he holds against you and as "progressive" when he 
finds in your favour. This kind of vilification and vituperative conduct pollutes the 
bench as a whole, including all its constituent judicial officers.  
 
[4] As might be expected, this unbridled criticism has elicited a strong reaction 
from a number of high-profile members of the legal profession, such as Chief 
Justice Pius Langa, former Chief Justice Arthur Chaskalson, Adv George Bizos 
SC, Dr Barney Pityana, Vice-Chancellor of the University of South Africa, the 
General Council of the Bar, the Law Society of South Africa, the South African 
Law Deans Association and, most recently, the newly appointed Minister of 
Justice, Mr Enver Surty, who has warned against eroding the integrity of the 
judiciary. In an article on "The Dispensable Judiciary" Brian Spilg SC1
The Judiciary is not some type of disposable nappy that can be regularly trashed 
and replaced. Our Judiciary stands for independence which is irreplaceable and 
any attack on the institution that succeeds or alters its makeup, undermines it for 
all time.
 observes 
that there has not been such a sustained attack on the highest court since the 
"High Court of Parliament" case in the 1950s: it has the potential to destroy the 
integrity of the Constitutional Court and to undermine public confidence in the 




[5] The purpose of my address to you this evening is to give you and other 
interested parties the assurance that, despite these unfortunate events 
involving important role players, the judiciary should continue to be a bastion or 
stronghold of the legal order, however challenging the times may be. I am 
 
  
                                            
1  Spilg 2008 Advocate 41-43. 
2  Ibid 43. 
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strengthened in this view by the democratic principles and values enshrined in 
our Constitution3
                                            
3  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
 which provides, in section 165(1), that the judicial authority 
resides in the courts. These courts, we are told in section 165(2), are 
"independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, which they must 
apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice".  
 
[6] In this regard I respectfully associate myself with the following observation 
of Chief Justice Langa in his opening address at the recent conference of the 
Commonwealth Magistrates' and Judges' Association: 
 
There are serious challenges still facing the country; they are being tackled. The 
great majority of our people have faith in the Constitution and its structures and 
institutions. The legislature still goes about its business, consulting its 
constituencies and making laws. The executive likewise carries on, making policy 
and running the governance of the country. The courts are still the interpreters of 
the Constitution and the law … Storms come and storms pass. We can still claim 
that the constitutional guarantee of an independent judiciary is alive and well in 
South Africa … The judiciary's place is firmly entrenched in the Constitution and 
any attempt to denigrate the judiciary excites great public alarm and attracts great 
adverse publicity for the person or institution who is so ill-advised as to do it.  
 
The truth of course is that the victories we have achieved should never be taken 
for granted. Eternal vigilance is required because the principles that underlie our 
new democratic order are so precious, so valuable, that they should never be put 
at risk. Only those who have lived through, or observed the pain of the divisions, 
inequalities and conflicts inherent in a society based on injustice can imagine the 
importance of maintaining and strengthening the new democratic structures and 
institutions that we have gained through the adoption of our new Constitution. One 
such is an independent judiciary in a democratic state.  
 
[7] This approach accords with the so-called Latimer House Principles 
endorsed by the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting held in Abuja, 
Nigeria, in 2003. In terms thereof "[a]n independent, impartial, honest and 
competent judiciary is integral to upholding the rule of law, engendering public 
confidence and dispensing justice". To achieve this ideal judicial appointments 
should be made on merit and judges should have security of tenure. This will 
engender public confidence and support without which, as Langa CJ puts it, the 
judiciary cannot function at all.  
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[8] Appointment as a judge, of course, brings with it certain duties and 
responsibilities. Inasmuch as the curial and private activities of judges are 
generally open to public scrutiny, they cannot complain if their conduct on and 
off the Bench elicits criticism or even censure. Their integrity, honesty, 
impartiality and independence from external influences, be they corruptive or 
intimidating, should be above question. Their private lives should be exemplary. 
The community at large accepts that they are only human and may hence be 
victims of the errors of human nature, but the stature they enjoy in the 
community requires them to be extra vigilant in ensuring that they themselves 
comply with the demands of the law and with the ethical and moral rules of 
conduct adhering to their elevated office.  
 
[9] The American Bar Association deals with judicial ethics in a Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct issued in February 2007. In the preamble thereto the following 
appears: 
 
[1] An independent, fair and impartial judiciary is indispensable to our system of 
justice. The United States legal system is based upon the principle that an 
independent, impartial, and competent judiciary, composed of men and women of 
integrity, will interpret and apply the law that governs our society. Thus the 
judiciary plays a central role in preserving the principles of justice and the rule of 
law. Inherent in all the Rules contained in this Code are the precepts that judges, 
individually and collectively, must respect and honor the judicial office as a public 
trust and strive to maintain and enhance confidence in the legal system. 
 
[2] Judges should maintain the dignity of judicial office at all times, and avoid both 
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in their professional and personal 
lives. They should aspire at all times to conduct that ensures the greatest possible 
public confidence in their independence, impartiality, integrity, and competence. 
 
These principles are restated in Canon 1 and amplified in Canons 2, 3 and 4: 
 
Canon 1: A judge shall uphold and promote the independence, integrity, and 
impartiality of the judiciary 
 
Canon 2: A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office impartially, competently, 
and diligently. 
 
Canon 3: A judge shall conduct the judge's personal and extrajudicial activities to 
minimize the risk of conflict with the obligations of judicial office. 
 
Canon 4: A judge or candidate for judicial office shall not engage in political, or 
campaign activity that is inconsistent with the independence, integrity, or 
impartiality of the judiciary. 
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[10]  A Code of Ethics for South African judges has been in circulation for 
some time, thanks to the endeavours of Judge LTC Harms of the Supreme 
Court of Appeal. To the best of my knowledge the judiciary as a whole has 
accepted it in its entirety, but there is still a question whether it will fit in with the 
series of draft judiciary bills which have been consistently rejected by the 
judiciary as attempts to control and inhibit the judiciary while impinging upon or 
even undermining judicial independence. This raises once again the question 
why the judiciary should not, as an independent third arm of government in 
terms of the Constitution and the age-old doctrine of separation of powers, be 
arranging its own affairs. Concurrent herewith is the question whether judges 
should not form their own association with a view to managing their own affairs. 
Up to now the members of the various divisions have been reliant on the good 
offices of their respective heads of court who meet a few times a year to 
consider and discuss judicial matters on behalf of their respective members. 
Some doubts have been raised, however, as to whether this procedure properly 
serves the best interests of the judges.  
 
[11] In S v Mamabolo4
[12] By virtue of this moral authority it is incumbent upon the courts and their 
judicial officers to resist any form of pressure to make a decision or grant an 
 Kriegler J adopted an innovative approach in 
considering the relatively weak position in which the judiciary finds itself as the 
third arm of government: 
 
In our constitutional order the judiciary is an independent pillar of state, 
constitutionally mandated to exercise the judicial authority of the state fearlessly 
and impartially. Under the doctrine of separation of powers it stands on an equal 
footing with the executive and the legislative pillars of state; but in terms of 
political, financial or military power it cannot hope to compete. It is in these terms 
by far the weakest of the three pillars; yet its manifest independence and authority 
are essential. Having no constituency, no purse and no sword, the judiciary must 
rely on moral authority. Without such authority it cannot perform its vital function as 
the interpreter of the Constitution, the arbiter in disputes between organs of state 
and, ultimately, as the watchdog over the Constitution and its Bill of Rights – even 
against the state. 
 
                                            
4  S v Mamabolo 2001 3 SA 409 (CC) par 16. 
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order one way or another. This was unequivocally stated in President of the 
Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union,5
[13] By the same token a judicial officer is required to adjudicate a case in 
accordance with the facts and the law and not according to his or her personal 
views or opinions. In this regard a pragmatic approach appears from the 
SARFU case:
 (the so-called 
SARFU recusal case) in the following terms: 
 
The nature of the judicial function involves the performance of difficult and at times 
unpleasant tasks. Judicial officers are nonetheless required to 'administer justice 
to all persons alike without fear, favour or prejudice, in accordance with the 
Constitution and the law. To this end they must resist all manner of pressure, 
regardless of where it comes from. This is the constitutional duty common to all 
judicial officers. If they deviate, the independence of the judiciary would be 
undermined, and in turn, the Constitution itself.  
 
6
                                            
5  President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union 1999 4 SA 
147 (CC) par 104. 
6  Ibid par 70. 
 
 
That a judge may have engaged in political activity prior to appointment to the 
bench is not uncommon in most if not all democracies, including our own. Nor 
should it surprise anyone in this country. Upon appointment, judges are frequently 
obliged to adjudicate disputes which have political consequences. It has never 
been seriously suggested that judges do not have political preferences or views on 
law and society. Indeed, a judge who is remote from the world that she or he has 
no views would hardly be qualified to sit as a judge. What I require of judges is that 
they should decide cases that come before them without fear or favour according 
to the facts and the law, and not according to their subjective personal views. This 
is what the Constitution requires.  
  
[14] The discussion of the separation of powers and the independence of the 
judiciary inevitably brings one to the question of judicial involvement in politics. 
Under the old dispensation much was written on the topic of executive-minded 
judges, some of whom had been so-called "political" appointees and were 
notorious for their regular findings in favour of the executive. One need only 
think of the well-researched works of Corder and Forsyth and any number of 
articles written by lawyers opposed to the old regime.  
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[15] An extremely useful study on "Judges, Politics and the Separation of 
Powers" has recently appeared from the pen of Professor Francois Venter.7 
Significantly the learned author referred to an unreported judgment of 
Nicholson J in Treatment Action Campaign v Government of the Republic of 
South Africa8
[16] It is, of course, nothing new that judges do, on occasion, direct vociferous 
comment and criticism at an act or inaction of a government organ. If this is 
deemed to be a judicial transgression I must confess that I too have been guilty 
thereof, particularly in regard to sloppy police investigations and magistrates 
who postpone matters all too easily without enquiring whether the further 
incarceration of an awaiting-trial accused is in the least justified. Judicial 
emotion, and even anger, may be comprehensible under such circumstances, 
but politically loaded comments and opinions not required for purposes of 
making a finding or coming to a conclusion, should be avoided at all costs. 
There is frequently a fine line that distinguishes unnecessary political comment 
from observations setting forth the reasoning of the court in coming to a 
particular conclusion. Criticism of minimum sentence legislation, which has the 
effect of removing a court's discretion to impose an appropriate sentence, is a 
 where the learned judge said the following regarding a 
government instruction not to comply with a particular order of court: 
 
If the Government of the Republic of South Africa has given such an instruction 
then we face a grave constitutional crisis involving a serious threat to the doctrine 
of the separation of powers. Should that continue the members of the judiciary will 
have to consider whether their oath of office requires them to continue on the 
bench. 
 
This passage prompted Prof Venter to inquire whether Nicholson J had in fact 
traversed "the boundary between politics and adjudication". On the other hand 
the concern of the learned judge was probably justified in view of the clear 
meaning of section 165(5) of the Constitution, which provides that organs of 
state are also bound by orders and decisions of the courts.  
 
                                            
7  Venter 2007 Speculum Juris 60-72. 
8  Case No 4575/06 D&CLD 28 August 2006 par 33. 
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far cry from suggesting that the death penalty should be revived as a deterrent 
to serious crime. 
 
[17] When considering judges and politics it is difficult to escape a reference to 
the appointment of judges. In the SARFU case9
[18] It must not, of course, be lost from sight that South Africa is in a 
transformational phase of its development as a young democracy. A candidate 
for appointment to the bench must hence not only be "a fit and proper person" 
to be so appointed as a judge, but his or her appointment must also be 
consonant with the need for the judiciary "to reflect broadly the racial and 
gender composition of South Africa".
 it is made clear that 
involvement in struggle or activist politics prior to 1994 would not disqualify a 
candidate for appointment to the bench. On the contrary it appears to have 
been elevated to a qualification, if not a prerequisite, for appointment. Because 
of this approach the judiciary has probably lost eminently qualified candidates 
for appointment to the various courts in South Africa. When their nominations 
for appointment to the Constitutional Court were unsuccessful, brilliant 
academics like Prof John Dugard and Prof Johan van der Vyver were lost not 
only to the judiciary, but to the country. Prof Dugard accepted a prestigious 
appointment as professor of international law at the University of Leyden and 
Prof van der Vyver was appointed to an equally prestigious chair of human 
rights law at the University of Emory in Atlanta, Georgia. 
 
10 In this regard Chief Justice Langa points 
out, in his aforementioned address,11
                                            
9  Supra n 5 par 72-76. 
10  S 174(1) and (2) of the Constitution. 
11  Par [6] supra. 
 that there has been significant 
improvement since 1994, when there was only one black judge on the Bench, 
namely Judge (later Chief Justice) Ismail Mohamed. As matters now stand 106 
of the 204 permanently appointed judges are black and 40 are women.  
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[19] It bears mentioning that a number of the initial judicial appointments 
reflecting the needs of a representative judiciary were not always successful, 
mainly because of a lack of experience and, in some cases, an emphasis on 
political considerations rather than ability. This situation may, at least partly, be 
attributable to the fact that, in terms of section 178 of the Constitution, the 
Judicial Service Commission (JSC) is "politically loaded" in the sense that, of its 
twenty-three members, only three are judges (the Chief Justice, the President 
of the Supreme Court of Appeal and one Judge President), four are practising 
lawyers (two advocates and two attorneys) and one is a legal academic. The 
remaining fifteen are so-called "political appointees", with the Minister of Justice 
in the forefront. Now that we are almost fifteen years into the new democratic 
dispensation, the time may be ripe to consider amending the Constitution to 
provide for a JSC consisting substantially, if not exclusively of judges, practising 
advocates and attorneys, and legal academics. They would, in my respectful 
view, be best qualified to carry out this extremely important function. 
 
[20] Just as the judiciary should be accorded full recognition and respect as an 
independent third arm of government, so also is it incumbent on judges to 
recognise and accord the necessary respect to the other arms of government, 
namely the executive and legislature. As Justice Kate O'Regan points out in her 
2005 FW de Klerk Lecture12
                                            
12  O'Regan 2005 
 "Checks and Balances: Reflections on the 
Development of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers under the South African 
Constitution", however, this does not render the executive and legislature 
immune from constitutional challenges based on fundamental constitutional 
rights. The principle of non-intrusion in the affairs of another branch of 
government must give way to judicial intervention when it is required to protect 
individual rights. Although non-intrusion is thus an important principle in the 
doctrine of separation of powers, it is not absolute. The Constitutional Court in 
fact has exclusive jurisdiction in certain matters affecting other branches of 
government (section 167(4)).  
www.puk.ac.za/ 13-14. 




[21] In his aforesaid article Prof Venter13 discusses these aspects of separation 
of powers under the heading "The Determination of the Boundaries between 
the Trias Politica"14 and comes to the following conclusion15
                                            
13  Par [15] supra. 
14  Venter 2007 Speculum Juris 69-74. 
15  Ibid at 74. 
 which I 
wholeheartedly endorse: 
 
The courts of the fresh South African democracy, torn between the drive to reform 
the system on the one hand, and frustration on the other by the lack of political will 
and capacity to improve and maintain the functions and procedures characteristic 
of a modern constitutional state, are increasingly hard put to find the balance 
between political engagement and judicial detachment. 
 
To find such balance, it is necessary, ironically, that it should be acknowledged by 
all judicial officers that they cannot escape politics. Such recognition is a 
precondition for a judge to engage with political material while keeping an open 
mind. A judge suppressing or ostensibly disowning his or her political inclinations 
in the belief, or on the pretext that, adjudication is merely an abstract, neutral 
activity, is prone to produce findings consciously or subconsciously tainted by 
those same inclinations. The detached and well-considered style of judicial 
language traditionally associated with the bench is, however, a precious aid to 
finding the right balance, because without it, either political frustration pours forth 
in inappropriate language, or real political prejudice is concealed behind 
verbosity… 
 
[22] It is expected of all judicial officers, regardless of the court in which they 
serve, to accord courtesy and respect not only towards the other branches of 
government, but also to one another. My own experience has been that High 
Court judges have little or no difficulty in treating their peers or colleagues 
serving on a higher Bench, such as the Constitutional Court or the Supreme 
Court of Appeal, with courtesy and respect. In the case of lower courts, such as 
the Regional or District Magistrates' courts, however, such treatment is 
frequently singularly lacking. I have found this somewhat disturbing since it is 
my view that all judicial officers are in service of the community and their 
relationship with one another should not be influenced by seniority or lack 
thereof.  
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[23] The essence of courtesy or respect, when disagreeing with or criticising 
the judgments or orders of any court or judicial officer, is to exercise restraint 
and to remain objective and detached at all times. It goes without saying that 
sarcastic comments or snide personal remarks should be avoided at all costs. 
Judges should refrain from abusing their position by indulging in inappropriate 
posturing or ego-driven "grandstanding". The individual judge is not important – 
the judicial office and function are. The greatest judges have frequently also 
been the greatest gentlemen who will be remembered for their sense of justice 
and fairness rather than their conduct. 
 
[24] Let me conclude on a historical note. Justice and fairness and the values 
occurring in the Constitution are as old as the hills. The wisdom and insight of 
great Greek and Roman lawyers and philosophers such as Socrates, Plato, 
Aristotle, Cicero, Gaius and Ulpian, nurtured and developed these values over 
centuries and they remain guidelines for us in modern times. The cardinal 
virtues of wisdom and prudence, courage, moderation and justice still underlie 
law and legal practice. Such virtues, and their many concomitant values, still 
constitute the instruments with which judges make their manifold decisions, 
however complex the case with which they are dealing. It is these virtues and 
values which prompt them to dedicate their lives and careers to achieving 
justice, fairness and reasonableness in all they say and do. And it is what they 
say and do in good faith and with reference to the moral values of the 
community they serve, that stimulates public confidence in the judiciary as a 
bastion of the legal order, however challenging the times may be. 
 
I thank you. 
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